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  1Abstract 
 
As households participating in the Food Stamp Program and other public assistance programs work 
more, the additional earnings are partially offset by a reduction in food stamp benefits and cash 
assistance from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI).  The rate at which food stamp benefits and TANF or SSI cash assistance are reduced with an 
increase in earnings is referred to as the program’s effective benefit reduction rate (EBRR).  This report 
derives FSP EBRRs for earnings with and without cross-program effects from adjustments to TANF or 
SSI cash assistance due to the additional earnings.  The estimated FSP EBRRs are combined with TANF 
EBRRs and SSI EBRRs to estimate an effective tax rate on earnings in terms of these program benefits.  
With the authority for TANF programs devolved to States in 1996 Welfare Reform Law, FSP and 
TANF EBRRs as well as effective tax rates on earnings will vary by State.  This report illustrates the 
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  2Introduction 
 
The Food Stamp Program (FSP) is a means-tested entitlement program that provides food benefits to 
low-income Americans.  In 2005, 42.7 percent of the 10.8 million households participating in the FSP 
also received cash assistance from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) or General Assistance (GA).  Of these multi-program participants, 11 percent 
received earnings (512,000 households in 2005).  The amount of food stamps a household receives 
depends on the household’s earnings and cash assistance from these other programs.  As earnings 
increase the total resources to a household increases but by less than the earnings due to a reduction in 
benefits from these programs.
1  With the benefits from TANF, SSI, and GA affecting the level of food 
stamp benefits (cross-program effects), multi-program participation leads to complex formulas for the 
increase in household total resources and reduction in food stamp benefits from an increase in earnings.   
 
A program’s reduction in benefits from an increase in earnings depends on cross-program effects, where 
one program's benefits affect a household's benefits from another program.  Cross-program effects are 
particularly important to working households that receive food stamps and cash assistance from TANF 
or SSI.  In working households, an increase in earnings will have a direct effect on food stamps, 
reducing them, as well as a cross-program effect on food stamps when those earnings reduce receipt of 
cash benefits from these other programs.  In general, cross program effects increase food stamps, 
partially offsetting the direct reduction in food stamps from the increased earnings.  The magnitude of 
the cross-program effect depends on the program’s earnings deduction.  In this report, we estimate the 
impact of a change in earnings on FSP benefits and total resources, taking into account cross-program 
effects from a change in TANF and SSI cash assistance due to a change in earnings.    
  3 
A program’s reduction in benefits from an increase in earnings also depends on the programs earning 
deduction.  To provide a work incentive and to help offset the cost of working, each program has an 
earning’s deduction that reduces the amount of earnings counted as income for benefit determination.   
The FSP has a 20% earnings deduction.  Similarly, SSI has a nationally uniform earnings deduction of 
50 percent of earnings above a standard earnings deduction of $65 plus work related expenses due to a 
disability.  Since welfare reform in 1996, States set TANF earnings deductions, which are a source of 
State variation in how earnings affect TANF cash assistance, food stamp benefits through cross-program 
effects, and total resources through program benefit reductions.
2      
 
This report derives FSP effective benefit reduction rates (EBRRs) for earnings -- the rates at which food 
stamp benefits change as a household receives more earnings, while also receiving cash assistance from 
TANF or SSI whose benefits also adjust to the change in earnings.  The formula by which the FSP 
adjusts benefits has a statutory rate of 30 percent of net income: as a household’s net income increases 
(decreases) by one dollar, food stamps are reduced (increased) by 30 cents.  Often the effective rate on 
changes in gross income will differ from the 30 percent statutory rate on changes in net income due to 
the effect of FSP deductions and cross-program effects from a change in cash assistance.  Without cross-
program effects, the 20 percent earnings deduction in the FSP results in an average FSP EBRR on 
earnings of -24 percent.  Though, the EBRR may be zero for some FSP participants and -36 percent for 
others depending on income and use of the excess shelter cost deduction in the FSP benefit formula. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
1 Total resources include cash income from the private sector of the economy such as earnings, plus cash and noncash 
benefits from government assistance programs. Earnings are counted as gross wages that is inclusive of taxes. 
2Assistance for Families with Dependent children (AFDC), the predecessor to TANF, had a nationally uniform earnings 
deduction.  It was $120 plus 1/3 of remaining earnings for the first four months of consecutive earnings.  After four months, 
the earnings deduction was $120, and after eight months it was $90.  The treatment of earnings by GA is more difficult to 
track and will not be analyzed in this paper. 
  4 
Cross-program effects with TANF from an increase in earnings lead to an average FSP EBRR of -7.4 for 
all States and a range of 9 percent to -36 percent, depending on the State’s TANF earnings deduction (as 
calculated with 2003 TANF earnings deduction regulations).  Our analysis illustrates how devolution of 
TANF policies to States effect food stamp benefits for households participating in both FSP and TANF.  
Although the FSP retains uniform national eligibility and benefit standards, in terms of common 
eligibility rules and a common FSP benefit formula, in effect, households that are otherwise similar can 
receive different amounts of food stamps based on the States in which they reside because of State 
TANF policies.  Cross-program effect with SSI leads to an average FSP EBRR of -11 percent, which is 
consistent across States given a nationally uniform earnings deduction and benefit formula.   
 
Household income and use or nonuse of the excess shelter cost deduction (shelter deduction) in the FSP 
benefit formula also influences the rate at which food stamp benefits change in response to an increase 
in earnings.  The FSP EBRR for earnings is lower for households that either do not use the shelter 
deduction or use it at the maximum value (-24 percent, without TANF or SSI cross-program effects), 
relative to the EBRR for households that use the shelter deduction at a non-maximum value (-36 
percent, without TANF or SSI cross-program effects).  When a household using the shelter deduction at 
a non-maximum value receives additional earnings the amount of shelter deduction is reduced which 
increases net income and lowers the food stamp benefit amount, resulting in a higher EBRR.  This 
impact of the shelter deduction on the FSP EBRR and household total resources will be explored in this 
report.  When household net income is zero and remains zero with additional earnings, due to low gross 
income and use of program deductions, then the FSP EBRR is zero in that food stamp benefits are not 
reduced as earnings increase.  This can occur up to some level of earnings as will be illustrated below.  
  5 
Though the analysis in this paper focuses on estimating the change in food stamp benefits from a change 
in earnings, we also estimate the change in total resources available to the household from the change in 
earnings.  Both estimates include cross-program effects with TANF and SSI.  For instance, an increase 
in earnings directly increases the resources available to a household but also cause a partially offsetting 
decrease in resources from program benefits.  The reduction in program benefits is an effective tax on 
earnings (Moffitt 2002).  Our estimate of FSP EBRR is an estimate to one component of the effective 
tax rate on earnings.  The EBRR for TANF and SSI add to the effective tax on earnings in context of a 
reduction in total resources to the household.  We provide estimates for these as well.  What we do not 
account for in our estimate of the effective tax rate on earnings is the adjustment to federal and state 
taxes including the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Medicaid, housing subsidies and childcare 
subsidies.  Considerable research has been carried out on estimating overall effective tax rate on 
earnings, briefly summarized below.  Our analysis provides greater detail on the FSP EBRR, focusing 
on the impact of State TANF earning deductions and the FSP’s shelter deduction on the FSP EBRR, and 
focusing on the combined EBRR for the FSP and TANF (also SSI) on household total resources.    
 
With devolution of State control over TANF, changes to State cash welfare programs may have been 
made without full consideration of possible cross-program effects with food stamps.  For example, the 
effect of the earnings deductions of State TANF programs on food stamp benefits has not previously 
been examined in the literature.  Given the interest in modifying and synthesizing existing programs into 
a comprehensive work support system, cross-program effects from TANF and SSI on FSP benefits and 
household total resources are systematically examined here in detail.   
 
  6Program Benefit Formulas 
Program benefits issued is based on a measure of household net income, which is the sum of all sources 
of "countable" income net of program deductions.  In general, the FSP, TANF, and SSI include the same 
sources of countable income, though some minor exceptions do exist.  Each program also has specific 
rules for deducting a portion of income from some sources and for deducting a portion of some 
household expenses to determine the household’s net income.  All three programs have an earnings 
deduction, though they differ by program.  The FSP also has a number of other deductions, whereas 
TANF and SSI do not.  It is also worth noting, food stamp benefits do not count as income in the benefit 
formula for TANF or SSI, but the cash assistance from TANF and SSI count as income for the FSP.   
The deductions and benefit formula for each program are presented below.    
Food Stamp Program Benefit Calculation 
To be eligible for benefits, household gross income must be at or below 130 percent of the poverty 
guideline, unless the household contains an elderly or disabled member in which case they are not 
subject to the gross income criterion. Gross income is the cash or money income from all countable 
sources for all household members.  Also, net income must be at or below 100 percent of the poverty 
guideline.  Net income is calculated by subtracting the deductions listed below from gross income.   
1.  Earned income deduction of 20 percent of the combined monthly gross earnings of household 
members.  Gross earnings include wages and salaries as well as self-employed net income.  
2.  Standard deduction of $134 for households of one to four people, $153 for 5-people, and $175 
for 6 or more people, in the continental United States in 2005.
3 
                                                 
3 Starting 2003, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (farm bill) replaced the $134 standard deduction for all 
households with a deduction that varies according to household size and is adjusted annually for cost-of-living increases.  It 
sets the deduction at 8.31 percent of the applicable net income limit based on household size.  No household will receive less 
than the deduction in place in 2002 ($134 for continental U.S.), or more than the standard deduction for a household of six. 
  73.  Medical deduction for non-reimbursed medical expenses by elderly or disabled members of the 
household that are greater than $35 per month.   
4.  Dependent care deduction for certain expenses for care of children or other dependents while 
other household members work, seek employment, or go to school.  There is a maximum 
monthly deduction of $200 per child under age 2 plus $175 per dependent age 2 or older. 
5.  Child support payment deduction for legally obligated child support payments to somebody who 
is not a member of the household.  
6.  Excess shelter expense deduction equal to the monthly unsubsidized shelter costs that exceed 50 
percent of gross income net of all other deductions.  Shelter costs include rent, mortgage 
payments, utility bills, property taxes, and insurance net of housing subsidies.
4  There is a 
maximum deduction for households without an elderly or disabled member of $388 in 2005.   
 
The use or nonuse of the shelter deduction influences the EBRR for earnings.  The shelter deduction is 
based on the principle that a household is expected to spend no more than 50 percent of its adjusted 
income on shelter costs.  If shelter costs exceed this amount, then the excess can be deducted from 
income, up to a maximum value.  Adjusted income from which the shelter costs are compared is cash 
income net of all other deductions.  In 2005, a majority of FSP households (68.5 percent) used the 
shelter deduction, with 19.7 percent of those that used the deduction using the maximum deduction.  
Harkness and Newman (2002) found that 38 percent of food stamp recipients received housing 
assistance using the 1999 American Housing Survey, while our analysis of the 2003 CPS-ASEC 
supplement finds that 31 percent of food stamp recipients received housing assistance.  These findings 
                                                 
4 A standard utility allowance is available to households that incur heating or cooling expenses separately from their rent or 
mortgage and to households that receive direct or indirect assistance under the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 
1981 (LIHEAA).  Some states allow homeless households a set amount for shelter costs. 
  8suggest that housing assistance may account for most FSP recipients not using the shelter deduction, 
though in 2005, 13.6 percent of FSP households had zero gross income and did not need the deduction.  
 
The food stamp benefit formula is used to compute the level of benefits using information on a 
household’s earned and unearned cash income, allowable deductions, and a statutory benefit reduction 
rate from a maximum benefit.  For an algebraic expression of the formula see the Box: Food Stamp 
Benefit Formula.  The level of monthly food stamp benefits is calculated by subtracting 30 percent of 
household net income, if any, from the maximum benefit amount for the household size.  The maximum 
benefit is based on 100 percent of the cost of the Federal Government's Thrifty Food Plan, and it varies 
by household size.
5  For 2005 in the continental United States, the maximum benefit amount ranges 
from $149 for a household of one, to $898 for a household of 8.  There is a minimum benefit of $10 for 
one- and two-person households.  No minimum benefit is set for larger households. The statutory benefit 
reduction rate of 30 percent of net income reflects the assumption that a household is expected to spend 
30 percent of its net income on food.   
 
[Box; Food stamp benefit formula, see the page following references] 
 
The food stamp benefit formula is equation 1 in the Box.  After various substitutions, the benefit 
formula becomes equation 4 or 7 depending on the shelter deduction.  If the shelter deduction is zero or 
the maximum amount, then equation 4 is used to determine a household’s benefit amount.  If the shelter 
deduction is between zero and the maximum amount, equation 7 is the relevant one.  The appropriate 
equation can be used to determine the change in benefit which results from a change in income by 
                                                 
5 Prior to PRWORA in 1996, the maximum benefit was 103 percent of the Thrifty Food Plan.  This was changed in 1996 
legislation to 100 percent, but indexing the Thrifty Food Plan to annual food-price inflation still occurs.   
  9source or a change in a deductible expense that may arise from a change in a noncash benefit that affects 
a deductible expense.  It is in context of these equations that we derive the FSP EBRR for earnings for 
households that also receive TANF and SSI cash assistance.   
 
Simplified reporting and transitional benefits are two State options in the FSP that modify the standard 
benefit calculation (Trippe 2004).  Both options reduce or eliminate the need for recipients to report 
income changes that do not make them ineligible for the program.  Consequently, benefits are not 
always adjusted as income changes during the certification period.  For households participating in the 
FSP under these options, the EBRRs temporarily fall to zero overriding the rates that would exist under 
the standard benefit formula.  At the time of recertification, these households in the FSP under 
simplified reporting would have benefits recalculated given the new level of earnings. 
TANF Benefit Calculation 
Basically, States may provide TANF benefits to a family that it defines as needy, if that family includes 
a minor child (under age 18) or a pregnant person.  There are technical qualifications to this basic rule 
related to the age of the minor child if they are attending school, living circumstances of unwed mothers 
under 18, legal aliens, and other stipulations.  The major financial eligibility rules are an asset limit, 
gross income limit, and net income limit all set by States.  Countable assets cannot be above a certain 
limit.  The gross income limit pertains to the sum of earned and unearned income.  Under the net income 
test some earnings are deducted from gross income to determine countable net income.  The portion of 
earnings disregarded for the net income eligibility test may be smaller than the portion disregarded when 
determining a recipient's benefits.   
 
  10States set the earning disregards for eligibility and benefit determination to provide a work incentive to 
TANF recipients and offset the costs of working.   The rules for TANF earning deductions vary by State 
and they tend to take a range of values (see Table 1).
6  The fixed dollar deduction (column 2 in Table 1) 
is the amount of earnings a household can receive without having any reduction in TANF benefits. 
Many States also deduct a percentage of additional earnings beyond the fixed deduction amount (column 
3 in Table 1).  As will be seen below, most FSP households who work and participate in TANF earn 
more than the fixed disregard.  Often States are more generous in their earnings deductions in the first 
months of work, and after some time, 4 to 12 months, the earnings deductions are reduced. Our analysis 
is focused on the cross-program effects with the percent earnings deduction that apply after about a year 
of earnings.   
 
Twenty-four States including the District of Columbia used both fixed and percentage deductions; 18 
States used a percentage deduction only; 7 States used a fixed deduction only; and 2 States had no 
earnings deduction and a flat grant amount.  The percentage deductions ranged from zero to 100 percent 
with 17 States using 50 percent (including NY at 51%), 4 States using 33.3 percent, and 4 States using 
20 percent.  For 17 States, the fixed deduction or the percentage deduction changed over the length of 
period the recipient worked.  The earned income deduction used by AFDC when it was replaced by 
TANF continues to be used by 3 States.  This consists of a $120 fixed deduction plus a 33.3 percentage 
deduction for four months, then a $120 fixed deduction only for the next four months, and finally a 
smaller fixed deduction of $90 thereafter.   
 
                                                 
6 We use the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database to specify State TANF earnings deductions (Urban Institute, 2005).  
For some States we use the earnings deductions that apply after a household member has been working for about a year. 
  11TANF cash assistance is set by the State.  Most states have continued pre-TANF maximum cash benefit 
schedules, while eighteen States have raised their cash benefit levels since 1995 (Urban Institute, 2005).  
Cash benefits in all but two States are calculated in one of two ways.  In 35 States, a family's benefit is 
the difference between countable net income and the maximum benefit for a family of its size.  In 14 
States, a family's benefit is the difference between countable net income and a specified standard, which 
is greater than the maximum benefit, but the benefit amount cannot be greater than the maximum 
benefit. Two other states, Arkansas and Connecticut, set benefits at either the maximum benefit or 50 
percent.     
SSI Benefit Calculation 
SSI is a means tested Federal program for cash transfers to people who are 65 or older, or blind, or have 
a disability.  Some states offer a supplement.  For adults, a disability exists when you have a physical or 
mental problem that keeps you from performing "substantial" work and is expected to last at least a year 
or to result in death.  The test for substantial work is whether you are able to engage in work that can 
earn $700 per month with impairment-related expenses subtracted. When deciding if a child is disabled, 
Social Security looks at how his or her disability (physical or mental) affects everyday life, in that there 
must be severe functional limitations.   
 
An eligible individual cannot have monthly net income in excess of the current federal benefit rate 
(maximum benefit amount).  The amount is the same for all States and is subject to annual increases as 
dictated by cost of living adjustments.  Since 1997, countable resources must be less than $2,000 for an 
individual and $3,000 for a couple.  After summing gross income from countable sources, a number of 
deductions are made to arrive at net income for benefit calculations.  The deductions are:  
(1) Standard deduction of $20.   
  12(2) Earnings deduction of $65 of earned income (in addition to the $20 if no unearned income).  
(3) Earnings deduction of work related expenses due to your disability or blindness (monthly).  
(4) Earnings deduction of one-half of the remaining earned income, after deductions 1-3. 
(5) Income set-aside under a plan for achieving self-support are excluded (PASS). 
 
The level of SSI cash assistance is set by subtracting net income from the full federal benefit rate 
(maximum benefit amount). In 2005, the individual full federal benefit rate was about $600 per month, 
while for an eligible couple it was about $900 per month.  
FSP Effective Benefit Reduction Rates (EBRRs) for Earnings 
The FSP EBRRs for earnings for food stamp recipients who also receive TANF or SSI cash assistance 
are presented in this section.  Data from the FSP-QC are used to determine the distribution of FSP 
households with these sources of income over the circumstances that result in different FSP EBRRs for 
earnings.  The distributional analysis is done for FSP households with earnings but no TANF or SSI 
cash assistance, FSP households with TANF or SSI cash assistance but no earnings, and for FSP 
households with earnings and TANF or SSI cash assistance.  For each combination of income sources, 
different EBRRs on earnings arise from whether the household’s benefits are at the minimum, 
maximum, (Bmin,  Bmax) or an intermediary level, and whether the household uses the shelter deduction 
or not and if they do whether it is at the maximum level or some intermediate level of use.  FSP EBRRs 
for earnings may also vary by State for FSP households with cross-program effects from TANF cash 
assistance due to different State TANF earnings deductions.  For six States with the largest FSP 
caseload, we estimate the FSP EBRRs for earnings with cross-program effects from TANF cash 
assistance.  With these estimated FSP EBRRs we calculate a weighted average over the different 
household circumstances for comparison with FSP effective tax rates estimated by Ziliak (2007) using 
  13an econometric model.  Finally, our estimated FSP EBRRs for earnings for FSP households with TANF 
or SSI cash assistance are combined with estimates of TANF EBRRs and SSI EBRRs for earnings to 
provide an estimate of the effective tax rate on earnings in terms of these program benefit reductions.  In 
these calculations w do not account for the effect of the EITC on the effective tax rate.     
Distribution of FSP EBRRs by household circumstance 
Discussion of the distribution of FSP EBRRs by household circumstance is divided into three parts.  We 
start with a discussion of FSP households with earnings but no TANF or SSI cash assistance.  This 
provides a basis to compare what happens to the FSP EBRRs for earnings when FSP households also 
receive cash assistance from TANF or SSI.  We also present the FSP EBRRs for TANF and SSI cash 
assistance without earnings for comparison purposes.  Finally, we present the FSP EBRRs for earnings 
when FSP households also receive TANF or SSI cash assistance. 
 
For earnings without cross-program effects and TANF or SSI cash assistance without earnings 
Table 2 provides a detailed breakout of the incidence of FSP EBRRs for earnings, TANF cash 
assistance, and SSI cash assistance (rows of Table 2).
7  The EBRRs for earnings is calculated for 
households with earnings but do not receive TANF or SSI cash assistance (no cross-program effects).  
The FSP EBRRs for these sources of income are derived from either equation 4 or 7 (see Box), 
depending on whether the shelter deduction is used at a non-maximum level.  Five blocks of two-
columns in Table 2 identify the relevant FSP EBRR for a change in gross income (for the income source 
in the corresponding row) and the percent of caseload under the circumstance of the column heading.  
The FSP EBRR depends on: 1) whether benefits are at the maximum (Bmax), minimum (Bmin), or an 
intermediary level, and 2) whether the household is using the shelter deduction at the minimum, 
                                                 
7 These values are from the 2005 FSP-QC database and correspond with data reported in USDA-FNS (September 2006). 
  14maximum (DH=0, DH=Max) or an intermediary level.  The last block of three-columns, at the far right of 
table 2, displays the average EBRR and the percent of total caseload for the row source of income.   
 
The average FSP EBRR for earnings without cross-program effects is -0.241, averaged over the 
circumstances of the household’s use or nonuse of the shelter deduction and whether they receive the 
minimum, maximum benefit amount or some intermediate amount.  The FSP EBRRs for earnings 
without cross-program effects range from -.36 for 43.0 percent of FSP households with earnings but no 
TANF or SSI cash assistance, -.24 for 36.1 percent of these households, and zero for 20.9 percent of 
these households.  The -.36 FSP EBRR for earnings occurs when the FSP household uses the shelter 
deduction at a non-maximum level and is derived from equation 7.  It is larger than the -.24 FSP EBRR 
(derived from equation 4) that occurs when the FSP household is either not using the shelter deduction 
or using it at the maximum level.  For a FSP household using the shelter deduction at less than the 
maximum amount, the additional earnings leads to a lower shelter deduction which increases net income 
and reduces benefits issued, consequently the FSP EBRR for earnings is larger.
8  For FSP households 
with zero net income and maximum benefits, we assume that the additional earnings do not lead to 
positive net income so that the FSP EBRR for earnings is zero and the additional earnings do not affect 
benefits.  At some level of earnings, the additional earnings will cause the FSP household’s net income 
to shift from zero to a positive value and benefits decline at either -.24 or -.36 depending on the shelter 
deduction.  For a one or two person FSP household with minimum benefits, we assume the additional 
earnings are small enough that they remain eligible for the minimum benefits and the FSP EBRR is zero, 
but the additional earnings could cause the household to be ineligible and lose its benefits.   
                                                 
8 The additional earnings for FSP households using the shelter deduction at the maximum level could be large enough that the 
use of the shelter deduction shifts to a less than maximum amount, which would shift the FSP EBRR for earnings from the 
lower value of -.24 to the larger value of -.36.  This section assumes the additional earnings are small enough that such a shift 
in the FSP EBRR does not occur.  In the next section, increases in earnings eventually cause this shift in the FSP EBRR.  
  15 
The average FSP EBRR for TANF cash assistance is estimated to be -.299, with a range from -.45 for 
43.9 percent of FSP households with TANF cash assistance, -.30 for 33.8 percent of these households, 
and zero for 22.4 percent of these households.  Similarly, the average FSP EBRR for SSI cash assistance 
is estimated to be -.352, with a range from -.45 for 68.3 percent of FSP households with SSI cash 
assistance, -.30 for 14.8 percent of these households, and zero for 16.8 percent of these households.  The 
FSP EBRR for TANF and SSI cash assistance without cross-program effects with earnings are the same 
and are larger than the FSP EBRR for earnings without cross-program effects because of the 20 percent 
earnings deduction.   
 
For earnings with cross-program effects from TANF cash assistance 
In 2005, 14.5 percent of FSP households received TANF cash assistance, with 18.6 percent of them also 
earning income from work (294,000 households).  Of these households, 93 percent (272,200 
households) did not receive SSI cash assistance.
9  When a FSP household also participates in TANF, a 
change in earnings not only has a direct effect on FSP benefits, the earnings change also has a cross-
program effect from TANF cash assistance on FSP benefits.  As earnings increase, TANF cash 
assistance is likely to decrease, but not dollar for dollar.  TANF earnings deductions determine the 
reduction in TANF cash assistance from an increase in earnings, which are set by States since welfare 
reform in 1996.  The Urban Institute’s (2005) “Welfare Rules Database” provides information on State 
TANF Earnings deductions, as summarized in Table 1.  Due to State specific TANF earnings 
deductions, the FSP EBRRs for earnings with TANF cash assistance are distinguished by State.       
 
                                                 
9 The remaining 21,800 households with earnings received both TANF and SSI, creating multi-program cross-program 
effects.  We do not assess their FSP EBRRs in this section.      
  16State TANF earnings deductions generally consist of two parts, a fixed deduction (disregard) and a 
percent of the remaining earnings (percent deduction).  For households with very low earnings, a small 
change in monthly earnings are less than the State TANF disregard, and TANF cash assistance does not 
adjust for the change in earnings.  However, from our tabulation of FSP-QC data (see Table 4) we find 
that most FSP households have earnings greater than the State TANF disregard so that additional 
earnings are subject to the State TANF percent deduction, which we focus on in our discussion below.   
 
For working FSP households who also receive TANF cash assistance, earnings have a direct and a 
cross-program effect on FSP benefits.  The direct effect takes one of two values depending on whether 
the FSP household is using the shelter deduction at less than the maximum amount (-.36), or whether 
they either do not use the shelter deduction or use it at the maximum amount (-.24).
10  First, consider the 
situation where the FSP household uses the shelter deduction at less than the maximum amount.  In this 
case, the FSP EBRR combines the -.36 direct effect with the cross-program effect of earnings on TANF 
cash assistance.  Earnings reduce TANF cash assistance by (1-z), where z is the State’s TANF percent 
earnings deduction.  The reduced TANF cash assistance increases FSP benefits by 45 percent (see Table 
2, shelter deduction at less than the maximum amount).  Combining the direct and cross-program 
effects, an increase in earnings reduces FSP benefits by -[0.36 - 0.45(1-z)] times the change in earnings.  
Rearranging terms, the FSP EBRR for earnings is [0.09 - 0.45z], which varies according to the State 
percent earnings deduction.  Similarly, for FSP households who do not use the shelter deduction or use it 
at the maximum amount, the FSP EBRR for earnings with cross-program effect from TANF cash 
assistance is -[0.24 - 0.3*(1-z)], or upon rearranging terms [0.06 - 0.3z].   
 
  17Table 3 presents the FSP EBRR for earnings by State with cross-program effect from TANF cash 
assistance (using percent earnings deduction in Table 1), for the two alternative circumstances relative to 
the FSP household’s use or nonuse of the shelter deduction.  Consider the circumstance where the FSP 
household uses the shelter deduction at less than the maximum amount.  In states where the TANF 
percent earnings deduction is 50 percent, as in Pennsylvania and sixteen other States, FSP benefits are 
reduced by 13.5 percent of the change in earnings.  If instead, the State TANF earnings deduction is 33 
percent, as in Kentucky and three other States, FSP benefits are reduced by 5.85 percent of the change in 
earnings.  When the State TANF earnings deduction equals the FSP earnings deduction of 20 percent, as 
in Nebraska and three other States, the direct and cross-program effects offset each other and the FSP 
EBRR is zero, i.e., there is no change in the FSP benefits due to increased earnings.  For a State with 
TANF earnings deduction less than 20 percent, as in Texas and six other States, the FSP EBRR is 
positive so FSP benefits actually increase with earnings due to the cross-program effect from TANF.  
For two states with a fixed TANF grant amount (Wisconsin and Arkansas), there is no cross-program 
affect from earnings due to change in TANF cash assistance, and FSP benefits only adjust by the direct 
effect of earnings on FSP benefits.   
 
Now consider the circumstances where the FSP household either does not use the shelter deduction or 
uses it at the maximum amount.  In states where the TANF percent earnings deduction is 50 percent, as 
in Pennsylvania and sixteen other States, FSP benefits are reduced by 9 percent of the change in 
earnings (Table 3).  For the 50 percent TANF earnings deduction and all other percent earnings 
deductions, the FSP EBRR for earnings with cross-program effects from TANF cash assistance are one-
                                                                                                                                                                         
10 The direct effect can be zero if earnings are small enough that net income remains less than or equal to zero (see table 2). 
Also, the direct effect can be zero for a one or two person household with minimum benefits if they remain eligible for FSP 
benefits with the additional earnings. These circumstances are less likely to occur and not discussed. 
  18third less when the FSP household either does not use the shelter deduction or uses it at the maximum 
amount, relative to using the shelter deduction at less than the maximum amount.   
 
The distribution of FSP households among the different FSP EBRRs for earnings with TANF cash 
assistance under various circumstances pertaining to the FSP household’s use of the shelter deduction 
and receipt of maximum and minimum benefits are presented in Table 4 for a selection of six States.
11  
The table also makes the distinction whether the earned income is less than the TANF fixed deduction 
(YE < YE disregard), where there is a 100 percent deduction, or whether the earned income is in the 
TANF percent deduction range (YE > YE disregard).  The average State FSP EBRRs for earnings, 
including both direct and cross-program effects, range from –0.09 to –0.14 for five of six States.  For 
one State, Texas, the average FSP EBRR is a positive 0.062.  Among these six States, a large percent of 
FSP households are subject to the TANF earned income percent deduction and use the FSP shelter 
deduction at the maximum amount or zero.  Under these circumstances, 43.6 percent of FSP households 
with earnings and TANF cash assistance in California have an FSP EBRR of -0.09.  A significant 
percent of FSP households with TANF cash assistance and earnings, in these six States, use the FSP 
shelter deduction at less than the maximum amount and consequently have a larger FSP EBRR (by one-
third) than that for FSP households that either do not use the shelter deduction or use it at the maximum 
amount.  A reduction in FSP benefits from an increase in earnings is larger due to the shelter deduction.     
 
Figure 1 ranks the FSP EBRR for earnings with cross-program effect from TANF cash assistance, under 
the circumstance of the FSP household using the shelter deduction at less than the maximum amount. 
While most States have a FSP EBRR between -.0225 and -.135, some have a zero and even positive FSP 
                                                 
11 We have chosen these States based on their large FSP caseload sample size in the FSP-QC database.  They account for 50 
percent of FSP households with both earnings and TANF cash assistance.     
  19EBRR for earnings.  Prior to welfare reform in 1996, the AFDC percent earnings deduction was 33 
percent, which leads to a FSP EBRR of -0.0585, an earnings deduction still used by 4 States.  Many 
States have increased their TANF earnings deduction, which results in a larger negative FSP EBRR, 
which implies a greater reduction in FSP benefits from the increase in earnings.  What the net effect of 
these changes in TANF cash assistance and FSP benefits to a change in earnings will be discussed below 
in context of the effective tax rate on earnings from these programs.      
 
For earnings with cross-program effects from SSI cash assistance  
The first row of results in Table 4 reports the FSP EBRRs for earnings with cross-program effects from 
SSI cash assistance.  In 2005, 7.3 percent of FSP households with SSI cash assistance received earnings 
(210,000 households).  Of these households, 90 percent (188,000 households) did not receive TANF 
cash assistance.  The FSP EBRR for earnings with cross-program effects from SSI cash assistance 
(without TANF) combines the cross-program effect of the change in SSI benefits from the additional 
earnings on FSP benefits with the direct impact of the change in earnings on FSP benefits.   
 
The Cross-program effect from SSI cash assistance depends on the SSI earnings deduction that applies 
to the additional earnings.  As can be seen by the distribution of FSP households with SSI cash 
assistance and earnings in Table 4, most (74.6 percent) have enough earnings that the 50 percent 
earnings deduction applies to any additional earnings (YE > YE disregard columns).  The FSP EBRR for 
earnings also depends on the FSP households use or nonuse of the shelter deduction.  For instance, 
assume that the household uses the FSP shelter deduction between zero and the maximum value and that 
they receive less than the maximum benefits.  Under these circumstances, SSI cash assistance decrease 
by 50 percent of the additional earnings which increases FSP benefits by 45 percent of the decrease in 
  20SSI cash assistance (see Table 2 for the 45 percent FSP EBRR for SSI cash assistance).  Consequently, 
the cross-program effect from a reduction in SSI cash benefits, due to the additional earnings, increases 
FSP benefits by 22.5 percent of the earnings.   
 
The direct effect from the additional earnings under these circumstances will decrease FSP benefits by 
36 percent of earnings (see Table 2).  The net result (36-22.5) is a reduction in food stamp benefits of 
13.5 percent of the additional earnings.  As seen from the first row of Table 4, this FSP EBRR for 
earnings with cross-program effects from SSI cash assistance occurs for 47.7 percent of FSP households 
who receive SSI cash assistance and have earnings.   
 
The other blocks of columns in the first row of Table 4 presents the FSP EBRRs for earnings with cross-
program effects from SSI cash assistance for other circumstances pertaining to the use or nonuse of the 
FSP shelter deduction, receipt of maximum and minimum FSP benefits, and whether the household’s 
earnings are greater than or less than the SSI fixed earnings deduction (disregard).  For instance, 26.9 
percent of FSP households with SSI cash assistance and earnings have a FSP EBRR for earnings of -.09 
when the FSP shelter deduction is either not used or used at the maximum level.  In this case FSP 
benefits are reduced by 9 percent of the additional earnings. 
 
Comparing the FSP EBRR for earnings with those from an econometric model 
We estimate an average national FSP EBRR for earnings from our analysis and compare it with a 
similar estimate from an econometric model in Ziliak (2007).  These two approaches to estimating the 
relationship between FSP benefits and earnings are similar but some differences exist which we discuss.   
 
  21Given our estimated average FSP EBRRs for earnings for households with earnings only and for 
households with earnings and TANF or SSI cash assistance, we calculate an average national FSP 
EBRR.  The average FSP EBRR for earnings with or without cross-program effects from TANF or SSI 
cash assistance (from Table 2 and 4)are averaged over the different circumstances pertaining to the 
household’s use and nonuse of the shelter deduction and whether they receive the maximum benefit, 
minimum benefit, or some intermediate value.  The average national FSP EBRR is estimated using these 
average FSP EBRRs and the shares of FSP households with the different combination of earnings and 
cash assistance from TANF or SSI as weights.  The average national FSP EBRRs are reported in table 6 
for 2003-2005.
12  We include an estimate for 2003 for comparison with an estimate by Ziliak (2007), 
where 2003 is the last year of his analysis.  In 2003, our estimated average national FSP EBRR for 
earnings is -21.1 percent.  It is slightly larger at -21.8 in 2004 and at -22.0 in 2005.  The average national 
FSP EBRR has been rising since 2000 as the FSP caseload has shifted towards more households with 
earnings only and less with TANF cash assistance and earnings.
13    
 
Ziliak’s estimated FSP effective tax rate follows an econometric tradition of estimating effective tax 
rates for AFDC and TANF.  For the FSP, the approach is to use the FSP-QC data to estimate an 
econometric model of food stamp benefits relative to earnings, unearned income, and a set of dummy 
variables for family size.  Ziliak estimates the coefficients of the model by State and over time (1983-
2003).  The earnings coefficient is the average effective tax rate, that is, the average relation between 
benefits and earnings.  Given State caseload shares, a weighted average national FSP effective tax rate 
for earnings is calculated to be -15.2 percent in 2003.     
                                                 
12 For the 21,781 FSP households with earnings that also receive cash assistance from both TANF and SSI, we have 
calculated a FSP EBRR of positive 0.0736, assuming a TANF percent earnings deduction of 50 percent along with the 50 
percent earnings deduction for SSI, and given that 52 percent of these households do not use the shelter deduction and 43 
percent use the shelter deduction at less than the maximum level and receive less than the maximum benefit amount.  
  22 
The econometric model results in a weighted average national effective tax rate that is 6 percentage 
points less than the average national FSP EBRR estimated from our analysis.  There is one technical 
difference in how the data are used in the two approaches.  Households with an elderly person were 
excluded from the FSP-QC data used in with the econometric model but not in our analysis.  Households 
with an elderly person account for 2.7 percent of households with earnings in 2003.  With sensitivity 
analysis, we find little effect of excluding the elderly on the average national FSP EBRR in our analysis, 
with the average national FSP EBRR only going from -21.1 percent to -21.2 percent.   
 
We suggest that the difference between our estimated average national FSP EBRR and Ziliak’s 
estimated FSP effective tax rates is a difference between a marginal tax rate and an average tax rate.  In 
the econometric model, the effective tax rate is the coefficient for earnings with respect to benefits 
issued.  It represents the average benefit amount per dollar of earnings for households with earnings. 
Whereas, in our analysis, we estimate a marginal effective tax rate on earnings over all households with 
earnings.  It represents how a small change in earnings will effect benefits given the initial circumstance 
of the household with respect to receiving the minimum or maximum benefit amount, or whether they 
use the shelter deduction or not and if so if they use it at the maximum level.  Our analysis assumes that 
the change in earnings is small enough that the change in household net income does not shift them into 
a different circumstance with respect to the shelter deduction or receipt of minimum or maximum 
benefit amount, which would lead to a different FSP EBRR.   
 
Also, our analysis does omit some circumstances that could influence the effective tax rate for the FSP 
that are implicitly taken into account in the econometric model of Ziliak.  For instance, we do not 
                                                                                                                                                                         
13 Average national FSP EBRRs were calculated to be -20.0 in 2000 and 2001 and -20.5 in 2002. 
  23account for use of the childcare deduction.  It is possible that a household is using the childcare 
deduction while working but they are not deducting all of their child care expenses nor are they 
deducting the maximum amount, while receiving maximum benefits.  In this case, additional earnings 
could be deducted and not counted as net income, which would lower the FSP EBRR in our analysis.  
We would expect this to be a very small number of households having little effect on the average 
national FSP EBRR, given that only 65,700 households are using the child care deduction and receiving 
maximum benefits in 2003. 
 
Effective tax rate on earnings from FSP, TANF and SSI benefit reductions 
The FSP EBRR can be combined with an EBRR for TANF or SSI cash assistance to derive an effective 
tax rate on earnings as the benefit reduction by these programs in response to an increase in earnings.  
The change in household total resources, when they participate in the FSP and TANF or SSI, from a 
change in earnings is the change in earnings net of the change in FSP benefits and TANF or SSI cash 
assistance.
14  Table 5 provides estimates for these effective tax rates.  Figure 2 illustrates the State 
variation in effective tax rates due to State variation in TANF earnings deductions.  The effective tax 
rates also vary by the FSP household’s use or nonuse of the shelter deduction.   
 
Across all States, the average (not weighted by State caseload) effective tax rate with TANF cash 
assistance is 68.4 percent for a non-maximum use of the shelter deduction and 65.3 percent for either the 
use of the shelter deduction at the maximum amount or nonuse of the shelter deduction.  This average 
effective tax rate combines a TANF EBRR of 59 percent with a FSP EBRR of 9.5 percent or 6.3 
percent, with the larger FSP EBRR for the use of the shelter deduction at less than the maximum 
amount.  In result, the household loses about 70 percent of its earnings mostly as a reduction in TANF 
  24cash assistance.  So long as the household also receives TANF cash assistance, the reduction in FSP 
benefits is relatively small.  If the household were not receiving TANF cash assistance, then the FSP 
EBRR increases to 24 percent or 36 percent depending on the shelter deduction (see Table 2).  It should 
be noted that we have used the TANF earning deductions that apply after the household member has 
been working for a number of months, the number of which varies by state (see Table 1).  If the TANF 
participant is just starting to work, the TANF earnings deduction is larger, resulting in a lower TANF 
EBRR and lower effective tax rate on earnings and a higher level of total resources.     
 
A lower TANF earnings deduction results in a larger TANF EBRR and hence larger effective tax rates. 
The FSP EBRR is smaller for a larger TANF EBRR, partially offsetting the increase in the effective tax 
rate from a larger TANF EBRR.  For instance, a TANF earnings deduction of 50 percent results in an 
effective tax rate of 63.5 percent for a non-maximum use of the shelter deduction and an effective tax 
rate of 59 percent for either the use of the shelter deduction at the maximum amount or nonuse of the 
shelter deduction.  The TANF EBRR is 50 percent while the FSP EBRR for the non-maximum use of 
the shelter deduction is 13.5 percent.  While a 33 percent TANF earnings deduction results in an 
effective tax rate of 72.9 percent or 70.9 percent depending on the shelter deduction.  In this case the 
TANF EBRR is 67 percent while the FSP EBRR for the non-maximum use of the shelter deduction is 
5.85 percent, less than the 13.5 percent FP EBRR with a 50 percent TANF earnings deduction. 
 
For all States the effective tax rate with SSI cash assistance is 63.5 percent for a non-maximum use of 
the shelter deduction and 59.0 percent for either the use of the shelter deduction at the maximum amount 
or nonuse of the shelter deduction.  This effective tax rate combines a SSI EBRR of 50 percent with a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
14 The EITC would further increase household income from the change in earnings, which we do not include in our analysis. 
  25FSP EBRR of 13.5 percent or 9 percent, with the larger value for use of the shelter deduction at less than 
the maximum amount.    
 
Conclusions 
This report derives FSP effective benefit reduction rates (EBRRs) for earnings -- the rates at which food 
stamp benefits are reduced as a household receives more earnings, with and without cross-program 
effects from adjustments to TANF or SSI cash assistance due to the additional earnings.  The estimated 
FSP EBRRs are combined with TANF EBRRs and SSI EBRRs to estimate an effective tax rate on 
earnings in terms of these program benefits.   
 
The goal of estimating FSP EBRRs and effective tax rates for earnings from the FSP and TANF (or SSI) 
is to illustrate several things about the treatment of earnings in the system of public assistance for low-
income households.  First, the estimated rates illustrate how program interactions between the FSP and 
TANF (or SSI) influence the net increase in household resources (income and noncash benefits) from 
earnings, given the reduction in program benefits from the earnings and the cross-program effects from 
TANF (or SSI) cash assistance to FSP benefits.  Estimates for these rates have not been presented as in 
this report since welfare reform legislation in 1996 devolved the setting of TANF earnings deductions to 
States.  Second, the report illustrates the State variation in FSP EBRRs and effective tax rates as result of 
State variation in TANF earnings deduction.  Third, the report illustrates how the estimated FSP EBRRs 
and effective tax rates vary with the use or nonuse of the FSP shelter deduction.  Fourth, the FSP EBRRs 
and effective tax rates affect household incentives to participate in the FSP and labor market.  Though 
the analysis in this report does not estimate the incentive effects, the analysis does estimate the tax rates 
under various circumstances for comparative purposes.   
  26 
In 2005, 29.3 percent of all FSP households worked, 14.5 percent received TANF cash assistance, and 
18.4 percent of FSP households with TANF cash assistance received earnings (about 290,000 
households).  For SSI recipients, the percent working was 1.9 percent in 2005 (210,000 households).  
While the number of households receiving food stamps that are working and participating in these other 
cash assistance programs is small, they are of policy significance given the interest in promoting work 
among adult members of low-income households.   
 
The FSP EBRRs for earnings are affected by the cash assistance received from TANF or SSI.  For FSP 
households that receive TANF or SSI cash assistance, the FSP EBRRs for earnings has a direct effect on 
FSP benefits, as well as a cross-program effect through the impact of earnings on the amount of cash 
assistance received from these programs, which count as income in the FSP benefit formula.  The direct 
effect from an increase in earnings is to reduce FSP benefits by 36 percent of the additional earnings if 
the household uses the shelter deduction at a non-maximum amount and by 24 percent if they either use 
the shelter deduction at the maximum amount or do not use it.  The cross-program effect partially offsets 
the direct effect by increasing FSP benefits.  That is, the additional earnings decrease the cash assistance 
from the other program, by an amount that depends on that program’s earning deduction, which lowers 
FSP net income, leading to an increase in FSP benefits.  The combined direct and cross-program effect 
of additional earnings on FSP benefits is generally a reduction in FSP benefits but by less than the direct 
effect, which implies negative EBRRs but one’s that are smaller in absolute value than those based only 
on the direct effect.  Though for some TANF earnings deductions, the FSP EBRRs are zero or positive. 
 
  27Since welfare reform in 1996, states set the TANF earnings deductions.  The magnitude of the cross-
program effect depends on State TANF earnings deductions which range from 0 to 100 percent with an 
average of 41 percent in 2003.  Most States allow a fixed amount of income to be disregarded and a 
percentage of additional earnings above the disregard that are deducted.  Often States are more generous 
in their earnings deductions in the first months of work, and after some time, 4 to 12 months, the 
earnings deductions are reduced.  Table 4 illustrates that most FSP households have enough earnings 
that they earn more than the fixed disregard.  For this reason, our analysis focused on the cross-program 
effects with the percent earnings deduction that apply after an initial period of earnings.   
 
The two most common State TANF percentage deductions on earnings are 50 percent (17 States) and 33 
percent (4 States), where the 33 percent one corresponds to the pre-welfare reform AFDC earnings 
deduction (see Table 1).  For TANF participants in a State with a 33 percent earnings deduction food 
stamp benefits can fall by 5.85 percent of additional earnings, while they can fall by 13.5 percent in a 
State with a 50 percent earnings deduction, with both estimates for a FSP household using the shelter 
deduction at a non-maximum amount.  These FSP EBRRs are one and one-half times larger than when 
the FSP household either does not use the shelter deduction or uses it at the maximum amount.  For a 
State TANF earnings deduction of 20 percent (4 States), the FSP EBRR is zero and there is no change in 
FSP benefits.  For a State with TANF earnings deduction less than 20 percent (7 States), the FSP EBRR 
is positive so FSP benefits actually increase with earnings due to the cross-program effect from TANF.  
For two states with a fixed TANF grant amount (Wisconsin and Arkansas), there is no cross-program 
affect from earnings due to change in TANF cash assistance, and FSP benefits only adjust by the direct 
affect of earnings on FSP benefits.   
 
  28As a general pattern, FSP EBRRs become larger in absolute value as the percentage TANF earnings 
deduction increases.  In other words, the more generous TANF is with its earnings deduction, the less 
TANF cash assistance is reduced by the earnings but the positive cross-program effect on FSP benefits 
is smaller and hence the reduction of FSP benefits is larger because there is less cross-program offset to 
the direct effect of earnings on FSP benefits.  Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of State FSP EBRRs 
for earnings with cross-program effects from TANF cash assistance for a non-maximum shelter 
deduction.  It is interesting to note the distribution about the pre-welfare reform AFDC earnings 
deduction of 33 percent with a FSP EBRR of -0.0585 for a non-maximum shelter deduction.  States 
have gone in opposite directions with the percent earnings deductions, some larger and some smaller.  
Another point illustrated by Figure 1 is that the FSP EBRR for earnings with cross-program effects from 
TANF or SSI cash assistance is smaller in absolute value than that for FSP households with earnings 
that do not receive TANF or SSI cash assistance (-.36 with a non-maximum shelter deduction), except 
for three States with a fixed TANF cash assistance amount or a 100 percent earnings deduction.  In other 
words, when FSP households that receive TANF or SSI cash assistance earn more income, they have a 
smaller reduction in FSP benefits than FSP households that do not receive TANF or SSI cash assistance.  
Across States the average FSP EBRR for earnings with cross-program effect from TANF cash assistance 
is about -.095, or -9.5 percent of earnings, compared to a benefit reduction rate of -36 percent of 
earnings with no cross-program effect. 
 
Household total resources increase from additional earnings, but by less than the additional earnings due 
to the reduction of food stamp benefits and TANF or SSI cash assistance that occur in response to the 
additional earnings.  The FSP EBRR can be combined with an EBRR for TANF or SSI cash assistance 
to derive an effective tax rate on earnings as the benefit reduction by these programs in response to an 
  29increase in earnings.  Table 5 provides estimates for these effective tax rates, while Figure 4 illustrates 
the State variation in effective tax rates due to State variation in TANF earnings deductions.  The 
effective tax rates also vary by the FSP household’s use or nonuse of the shelter deduction but not by as 
much as the FSP EBRR since the TANF or SSI EBRR is not influenced by the shelter deduction.  
Across all States, the average effective tax rate on earnings with TANF cash assistance is about 70 
percent for a non-maximum use of the shelter deduction.  This average effective tax rate combines a 
TANF EBRR of 59 percent with a FSP EBRR of 9.5 percent.  This is twice the effective tax rate on 
earnings for a FSP household that does not receive TANF or SSI cash assistance, where the effective tax 
rate is 36 percent for a non-maximum use of the shelter deduction.  For all States, except for those with 
either a 100 percent TANF earnings deduction or fixed TANF amount of cash assistance, the effective 
tax rate with cross-program effects from TANF or SSI cash assistance is larger than that for FSP 
households that do not receive TANF or SSI cash assistance.   
 
Cross-program effects from TANF or SSI cash assistance on FSP benefits are an important 
consideration when integrating government assistance programs into a support system for low-income 
households.  State and local welfare policymakers may find this review of FSP EBRRs and effective tax 
rates informative in considering changes to programs which interact with food stamps, while FSP 
policymakers may find this review useful on how changes in other programs affect food stamp benefits.   
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  31Box: Food Stamp Benefit Formula. 
 
(1)  B = max [BBmin , Bmax - rYnet ] 
Where, 
B:  Dollar value of food stamp benefits received by a household 
BBmin:  Minimum food stamp benefit   
BBmax:  Maximum food stamp benefit, which varies with household size  
r:  Statutory benefit reduction rate from maximum benefits, r = 0.3  
Ynet:  Household monthly cash income net of deductions 
 
Net income (Ynet) is gross countable cash income net of FSP deductions, not gross income net of taxes: 
(2) Ynet = Yg - DE - DS - DD - DM - DH - DC  
where, 
Yg:  Gross countable cash income  
DE: Earnings  deduction    
DS: Standard  deduction 
DD:  Dependent care deduction, net of subsidies and subject to a maximum  
DM:  Medical deduction, expenses for the elderly and disabled net of subsidies 
DH:  Excess shelter cost deduction, net of subsidies and subject to a maximum  
DC:  Child support payment deduction   
 
Gross income Yg is all sources of countable cash income without deductions and without tax deductions:  
(3) Yg = YEarn + YTanf + YSSI + YOther  
where,  
YEarn:  Earnings of wages and salaries plus self-employed income  
YTanf:  Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance   
YSSI:  Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cash assistance   
YOther:  other sources of cash income   
 
Substitute (3) into (2) and (2) into (1), substitute for DE with the earnings deduction rate (e) times earnings, and 
include subsidies.  For eligible households that receive more than Bmin the result is: 
(4) B = Bmax + rDH - r(1-e)YEarn + r[DS + DD  + DM  + DC] - r[YTanf + YSSI + YOther] 
Where,  
e:  Earnings deduction rate, e = 0.2 
 
The shelter deduction is constrained by a maximum deduction and by a minimum of zero: 
(5) DH = min{Dmax, max[Dh,0]} 
Where (note the distinction in subscript h and H), 
(6) Dh =  CH  - 0.50 [YG - DS - DE – DD – DM - DC]  
where, 
CH:  Shelter cost (including utilities) net of housing subsidies  
 
Assuming the shelter deduction is Dh and not zero or the maximum, substitute (6) into (4), explicitly include 
subsidies with the deductions, and rearrange terms to get: 
(7) B = Bmax + r CH  + 1.5r[DS + DD + DM + DC] - 1.5r[YTanf + YSSI + YOther] - 1.5r(1-e)YEarn
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Table 1. State TANF earnings deductions, July 2003 
        
  TANF TANF    
  fixed percent   
Alabama 0  20    100% for the first 3 months, 20% thereafter  
Alaska 150  33    for first 12 months 
Arizona 90  30    
Arkansas 0  100    no disregards, flat grant amount 
California  225 50    
Colorado 0  66.7    for 12 months, then $120 and 33% for 4 months, $120 for next 8 months, $90 thereafter  
Connecticut 0  100    100% of the federal poverty level 
Delaware 120  33    for 4 months, $120 for next 8 months, $90 thereafter  
Washington DC  160  66.7    
Florida  200 50    
Georgia 120  33    for 4 months, $120 for next 8 months, $90 thereafter  
Hawaii 200  36    stated as 20%, $200, and 36% of remainder 
Idaho 0  40    
Illinois  0 67    
Indiana 0  75    
Iowa 0  70    20% of gross earnings plus 50% of earnings net of diversions 
Kansas 90  40    
Kentucky 120  33    100% for two months, then as reported for 4 months, $120 for next 8 months, then $90 
Louisana 120  0    plus $900 over 6 months 
Maine 108  50    
Maryland 0  40    
Massachusetts 120  50    for recipients nonexempt from work requirements.  For exempt replace percent with 33.3 
Michigan 200  20    
Minnesota 0  38    
Mississippi 90  0    100% for first 6 months, $90 thereafter 
Missouri 90  66.6    for first 12 months, then $90 therafter  
Montana 200  25    
Nebraska 0  20    
Nevada 0  50    100% for 3 months, 50% for months 4-12,  $90 or 20% (which ever is greater) therafter. 
New Hampshire  0  50    
New Jersey  0  50    100% for 1 month, then 50% thereafter 
New Mexico  125  50    
New York  90 51    
North Carolina  0  27.5    100% for 3 months  then 27.5% thereafter 
North Dakota  180  25    $180 or 27% whichever is greater after one year 
Ohio 250  50    
Oklahoma 120  50    
Oregon 0  50    
Pennsylvania  0 50    
Rhode Island  170  50    
South Carolina  100  0    50% for 4 months, $100 thereafter 
South Dakota  90  20    
Tennessee 150  0    
Texas  120 0    $120 and 90% of remainder for 4 months, $120 after 4 months  
Utah 100  50    
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Vermont 150  25    
Virginia 90  0    $120 and 33% of remainder in first 4 months, $120 next 8 months, $90 thereafter 
Washington 0  50    
West Virginia  0  40    
Wisconsin 0  100    no disregards, flat grant amount 
Wyoming 200  0    
average 85.1  41.0    
1. Source: Urban Institute (April 2005), Welfare Rules Databook, Table II.A.1. 
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Table 2. Food Stamp Program Effective Benefit Reduction Rates (EBRR) without cross-program effects, 2005           
                         
  Ynet = 0  Ynet> 0      
  Bmax  Bmin  B >min, <max      
    
%   
Cases    




%   
Cases  DH =0  %   Cases 
DH >0, 
<max  %   Cases  avg ebrr 
cases, 
thous. 
% of total 
cases 
Sources of YG:                               
 YE  only, no TANF or SSI  0  18.4  0  2.5  -0.24  14.7  -0.24  21.4  -0.36  43.0  -0.241  2697.7  24.9 
 TANF cash assistance   0  21.6  0  0.8  -0.3  9.8  -0.3  24.0  -0.45  43.9  -0.299  1583.9  14.6 
 Supplemental Security Income (SSI)  0  10.9  0  5.9  -0.3  0.1  -0.3  14.7  -0.45  68.3  -0.352  2871.6  26.5 
                         
Caseload data are from USDA-FNS, FSP-QC 2005                            
1. Cases with zero gross income (13.64 percent or 1479.983 thousand cases) are included in the Ynet = 0, Bmax category.           
Note: An effective benefit reduction rate measures the rate of reduction in FSP benefits from an increase in cash income           
 
 
 Table 3.  State FSP Effective Benefit Reduction Rate for earnings with TANF cash assistance 
    (Given State TANF Earning Deductions, July 2003
1)  
    
  FSP EBRR  FSP EBRR 
  non-max shelter deduction  max or 0 shelter deduction 
    
Alabama  0.0000 0.0000 
Alaska  -0.0585 -0.0390 
Arizona  -0.0450 -0.0300 
Arkansas  -0.3600 -0.2400 
California  -0.1350 -0.0900 
Colorado  -0.2102 -0.1401 
Connecticut  -0.3600 -0.2400 
Delaware  -0.0585 -0.0390 
Washington D.C.  -0.2102 -0.1401 
Florida  -0.1350 -0.0900 
Georgia  -0.0585 -0.0390 
Hawaii  -0.0720 -0.0480 
Idaho  -0.0900 -0.0600 
Illinois  -0.2115 -0.1410 
Indiana  -0.2475 -0.1650 
Iowa  -0.2250 -0.1500 
Kansas  -0.0900 -0.0600 
Kentucky  -0.0585 -0.0390 
Louisana  0.0900 0.0600 
Maine  -0.1350 -0.0900 
Maryland  -0.0900 -0.0600 
Massachusetts  -0.1350 -0.0900 
Michigan  0.0000 0.0000 
Minnesota  -0.0810 -0.0540 
Mississippi  0.0900 0.0600 
Missouri  -0.2097 -0.1398 
Montana  -0.0225 -0.0150 
Nebraska  0.0000 0.0000 
Nevada  -0.1350 -0.0900 
New Hampshire  -0.1350 -0.0900 
New Jersey  -0.1350 -0.0900 
New Mexico  -0.1350 -0.0900 
New York  -0.1395 -0.0930 
North Carolina  -0.0338 -0.0225 
North Dakota  -0.0225 -0.0150 
Ohio  -0.1350 -0.0900 
Oklahoma  -0.1350 -0.0900 
Oregon  -0.1350 -0.0900 
Pennsylvania  -0.1350 -0.0900 
Rhode Island  -0.1350 -0.0900 
south Carolina  0.0900 0.0600 
South Dakota  0.0000 0.0000 
Tennessee  0.0900 0.0600 
Texas  0.0900 0.0600 
Utah  -0.1350 -0.0900 
Vermont  -0.0225 -0.0150 
Virginia  0.0900 0.0600 
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Washington  -0.1350 -0.0900 
West Virginia  -0.0900 -0.0600 
Wisconsin  -0.3600 -0.2400 
Wyoming  0.0900 0.0600 
average -0.0945 -0.0630 




Table 4. Food Stamp Program Effective Benefit Reduction Rates (EBBR) on earnings with cross-program effects from TANF and SSI, 2005     
                    
  Ynet = 0  Ynet> 0     
  Bmax  Bmin  B >min, <max     
             YE < YE disregard  YE > YE disregard     
    
% 




or =0  % Cases 
DH >0, 
<max %  Cases 
DH max 
or =0  % Cases 
DH >0, 
<max  % Cases  avg ebrr 
cases, 
thous. 
Households with YE and:                                    
SSI only, no TANF  0  4.2  0  12.3  -0.24 0.9  -0.36 8.1  -0.09 26.9  -0.135 47.7  -0.120 188.0 
TANF only, no SSI                    
      - NY  0  9.2  0  0.0  -0.24  7.3 -0.36  0.0 -0.09  58.3 -0.135  25.1 -0.104  12.7 
      - CA  0  5.0  0  2.3  -0.24  5.1 -0.36  10.4 -0.09  43.6 -0.135  33.4 -0.134  80.5 
      - TX  0  26.8  0  1.7  -0.24  0.0 -0.36  0.0  0.06  6.2 0.09 65.3  0.062  23.7 
      - FL  0  36.1  0  0.0  -0.24  15.4 -0.36  9.3 -0.09  16.6 -0.135  22.6 -0.116  6.8 
      - IL  0  17.0  0  0.0  -0.24  0.0  -0.36 0.0  -0.141  44.6  -0.2115 38.4  -0.144  3.3 
      - PA  0  21.0  0  0.0  -0.24  0.0  -0.36 0.0  -0.09  38.9 -0.135  40.1 -0.089  12.8 
                    
Caseload data are from USDA-FNS, FSP-QC 2005            
Note: An effective benefit reduction rate measures the rate of reduction in FSP benefits from an increase in cash income       
 
 Table 5.  State effective tax rate on earnings     
    (Given State TANF Earning Deductions, July 2003
1)    
      
  Effective tax rate on earnings  Effective tax rate on earnings  TANF/SSI EBRR 
 non-max  shelter  deduction  max or 0 shelter deduction   
      
Earnings, no TANF or SSI  0.360  0.240  0.0000 
SSI 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
  State TANF        
Alabama 0.800  0.800  -0.8000 
Alaska 0.729  0.709  -0.6700 
Arizona 0.745  0.730  -0.7000 
Arkansas 0.360  0.240  0.0000 
California 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
Colorado 0.543  0.473  -0.3330 
Connecticut 0.360  0.240  0.0000 
Delaware 0.729  0.709  -0.6700 
Washington D.C.  0.543  0.473  -0.3330 
Florida 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
Georgia 0.729  0.709  -0.6700 
Hawaii 0.712  0.688  -0.6400 
Idaho 0.690  0.660  -0.6000 
Illinois 0.542  0.471  -0.3300 
Indiana 0.498  0.415  -0.2500 
Iowa 0.525  0.450  -0.3000 
Kansas 0.690  0.660  -0.6000 
Kentucky 0.729  0.709  -0.6700 
Louisana 0.910  0.940  -1.0000 
Maine 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
Maryland 0.690  0.660  -0.6000 
Massachusetts 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
Michigan 0.800  0.800  -0.8000 
Minnesota 0.701  0.674  -0.6200 
Mississippi 0.910  0.940  -1.0000 
Missouri 0.544  0.474  -0.3340 
Montana 0.773  0.765  -0.7500 
Nebraska 0.800  0.800  -0.8000 
Nevada 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
New Hampshire  0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
New Jersey  0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
New Mexico  0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
New York  0.630  0.583  -0.4900 
North Carolina  0.759  0.748  -0.7250 
North Dakota  0.773  0.765  -0.7500 
Ohio 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
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Oklahoma 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
Oregon 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
Pennsylvania 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
Rhode Island  0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
south Carolina  0.910  0.940  -1.0000 
South Dakota  0.800  0.800  -0.8000 
Tennessee 0.910  0.940  -1.0000 
Texas 0.910  0.940  -1.0000 
Utah 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
Vermont 0.773  0.765  -0.7500 
Virginia 0.910  0.940  -1.0000 
Washington 0.635  0.590  -0.5000 
West Virginia  0.690  0.660  -0.6000 
Wisconsin 0.360  0.240  0.0000 
Wyoming 0.910  0.940  -1.0000 
      
average 0.684  0.653  -0.5899 
maximum 0.910  0.940  0.0000 
minimum 0.360  0.240  -1.0000 
1. Source: Urban Institute (April 2005), Welfare Rules Databook, Table II.A.1.     
 Table 6 Weighted Average national FSP EBRR for earnings               
               
  2003  2003 2003 2004 2004 2004  2005  2005 2005 
  avg ebrr  % cases  cases  avg ebrr  % cases  cases  avg ebrr  % cases  cases 
    with earnings  with earnings    with earnings  with earnings    with earnings  with earnings 
              
Earnings only, no TANF or SSI  -0.239  80.8 2046.5  -0.240  82.9 2400.2 -0.241  84.8  2697.7 
Earnings with SSI, no TANF  -0.107  6.7 168.8  -0.122  6.2 178.6 -0.120  5.9  188.0 
Earnings with TANF, no SSI  -0.090  11.4 289.8  -0.109  10.2 296.2 -0.093  8.6  272.2 
Earnings with TANF and SSI  0.074  1.1 27.5  0.074  0.7 21.4 0.074  0.7  21.8 
               
Weighted Average  -0.210  100.0  2532.6  -0.217 100.0  2896.3  -0.219 100.0  3179.7 
 
 
  41Figure 1. State FSP EBRR for earnings with TANF cash assistance





















































































































































  42Figure 2. State effective tax rate for earnings from food stamps and TANF, 


















































































































































Effective tax rate on earnings
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